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The fundamental paradigm shift from traditional value chains to agile service value 
networks implies new economic and organizational challenges. As coordination 
mechanisms, auctions have proven to perform quite well in situations where 
intangible and heterogeneous goods are traded. Nevertheless, traditional 
approaches in the area of multidimensional combinatorial auctions are not quite 
suitable to enable the trade of composite services. A flawless service execution and 
therefore the requester’s valuation highly depends on the accurate sequence of 
the functional parts of the composition, meaning that in contrary to service 
bundles, composite services only generate value through a valid order of their 
components. The authors present an abstract model as a formalization of service 
value networks. The model comprehends a graph-based mechanism 
implementation to allocate multidimensional service offers within the network, to 
impose penalties for non-performance and to determine prices for complex 
services. The mechanism and the bidding language support various types of QoS 
attributes and their (semantic) aggregation. It is analytically shown that this variant 
is incentive compatible with respect to all dimensions of the service offer (quality 
and price). Based on these results, the authors numerically analyze strategic 
behavior of participating service providers regarding possible collusion strategies. 
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